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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Resp-ondent,

SALT LAKE

Case No. 6-376
STATE OF

UTAH,
.Ap·peUant.

RESPONDEN_T'S BRIEF

The Respondent, Salt Lake City, eommenced an action April 8, 1940 to quiet title to a parcel of land described as follows:
All of lots 8, 9 .and 10 in Block 2, Plat '' K' ',
Salt L·ake City Survey.
1

~It

was alleged in the City's 1Complaint that the Respondent wa.s the owner of said land and that the Defendant, State of Utah, ·claimed an interest therein, which
interest had no foundation in law and prayed that its title
be quieted. (R. 1-2} ·The Defendant, Sltate of Utah, filed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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2

its general D·emurrer ( R. 4), which De~urrer was by
1

the .District ·C·ourt on May 6, 1940 overruled. (R. 6) The
Defendant filed its answer May 17, 1'940 by which it
denied P'laintiff''s ownership of the land described in the
eomplaint and alleged that said land was conveyed by
deed for a valuable consideration to the State of Utah
July 9, 18'.95, which deed was exe·cuted by the Plaintiff
who then was the owner thereof and who conveyed a good
title to the Defendant. That the Defendant had, since
said date, !been in posse·ssion ·of said land and at the time
of the filing of the answer owned the same. (R. 8, ~ and
10) The Plaintiff, .Salt Lake City, filed its Amended
Reply September 2·6, 1940 wherein it alleged that Plaintiff, being the owner of said land descrihed in the complaint, conveyed the same by deed to the Defendant July
9, 189·5, which deed is attached ·to paragraph 2 of its
Amended Reply as an Exhibit and as a part of said
Reply, and after the words of conveyance and deseription of the pr·operty carried. the following qualification:
'·'i8o long as ·said premises shall he used for a mansion or
residenc~ :by the E·xecutive of said territory for the State
of Utah.
But in case said property shall not be used by said
territory or ·State for an executive mansion or residence
then this deed shall become void and of no effe-ct and said
proper~ty, with all the impr·ovements and appurtenances
thereon or thereunto belonging, shall revert to and beeome the property of the said first party as fully and
absolutely as if this deed had not been 1nade. '' (R. 17)
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It is further alleg·ed by the Plaintiff's Amended
Reply that said real property des~ribed in the complaint
was conveyed to and received by the Defendant upon the
above described limitation and qualification and that the
Defendant, ·State of Utah, had not so used it, but on
the contrary, and pursuant to Chapter 1~51, Laws of Utah,
1937, did accept .a. conveyance of land and residenee
located thereon for its E·xHcutive Mansion from one
,Jennie J. Kearn·s, which land and residence has since
its conveyance to said Defendant April 28, 19;37, been
kept, used and maintained by the ·State of Utah as the
residence and Executive Mansion of the Governor of
Utah. That by reason thereof the land described in the
Plaintiff's complaint reverted to and became the property
of S.alt Lake City. (R. 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19).
·The case ·was tried N.ovem;ber 28, f940 before the
Honorable Bryan P. Leverich in Salt Lake City. (R.
2·3) Thereafter and on February 13, 1941 the said Third
District C·ourt made the following order: ''The within
case having been heretofore submitted to the Court without argument, and by the :Court taken under advisement,
and the Court now, after ·eonsidering the evidence and
all the authorities cited, orders that Plaintiff be granted
a de,cree quieting its title to the real estate described in
Plaintiff's complain~ as prayed." (R. 22)
~Ou

February 18, 1g.41 the same Court n1ade its find-

ings of fact by \vhich it found that the Plaintiff, Salt Lake
City, owned the real property and eonveyed the same on
.July f), 189·5 to Defendant, State of Utah, as alleged in
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Plaintiff's Amended R.eply, upon the limitation and
qualification set out in said deed and that the real property descrilbed in said deed reverted to and became the
property of Salt Lake City, Plaintiff, as it was not used
nor intended to be used by appellant as an Executive
Mansion or residence. That the Defendant, State of Utah,
failed to use said real property for the Governor's residence, acquired another parcel of land for that purpose
and abandoned the use of said real property above des·cribed as a Governor's residence and terminated its fee
therein (R. 24, 2,5 and 2:6) and the said Court concluded
that the said real property reverted to the Plaintiff. (H.
2'6, 27) Judgment was entered February 18, 19,41 quieting title to the real property described in Plaintiff's complaint in .Salt Lake City. (R. 28) Notice of the decision
of the Court w.as given to Defendant, ~state of Utah,
Fehruary ·20, 1941. The D·efendant, ~State of Utah, served
and filed its Notice of Appeal May 2, 1941. ·Three errors
were assigned by Defendant ·On .June 12, 1941 as follows:
1

1.

Finding of Fact Number 6.

2.

C:onclusion of Law Number 1.

3.

The Judgment.

No Bill of Exceptions was settled or filed. Appellant
filed its Brief June 24, 1941 wherein it is contended that
the c·ourt erred in the 3 particulars set out in its Assignment of Errors. (Appellant's Brief, pages 6 and 1).
As above noted we have before us for consideration
only the pleadings in determining whether or not the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5
Court erred in making its Finding· of F,Jtct No. 6, its Con"' elusion of La\\~ No. 1 and its Judgn1ent.

'

·,

The Finding of Fact No. 6 assigned as error by Appellant is based upon the evidence received by the Court
at the trial of the case and since there is not before us
any of the evidence it seems that

\Ye

must, as a matter

of la\Y, assume that the Finding· of F·act is amply supported by the evidence received at the trial.
I

__

~_!

-

,.
~~
,_

jr:·

The Conclusion of La\Y No. 1 assigned as error lby
Appellant is 1ba.sed upon the Findings of Fa:ct. No c-ontention is made that the Findings of Fact do not support
this conclusion. If the ,C:onclusion is one which may be
lawfully made from the Findings of Ftact then the assignm·ent by Plaintiff that the Conclusion is erroneous
should fail. No contention is made ~by the Appellant that
the pleadings of the Plaintiff, that is, the Complaint and
the Amended Reply, failed to state a cause of action, nor
is any such ·contention ·tenable. The Judgment is supported by the pleadings. Since we have before us only
the pleading·s for consideration, it seems to us that, if
the pleadings state a cause of action, the assignment
rnade by Appellant that Court erred in making its judg1nent should fail.

~
m:

~i

No motion for a new trial was made. ·The Defend~ ant has brought as its record on appeal only the- judgment
roll ( Seetion 104-30-14, R. S. U. 19 33). No bill -of excep1

1

0
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tions is included in the record (!Section 104-39-4, R. S. U.
1933). Where the evidence ha~ not been brought up and
presented to this Court by a .Bill of Exceptions it must
be presurned that such evidence is sufficient to sustain
the judgment, 5 C. J·. S. Appeal and Error 1574 B, page
448, and the cases ·cited in Note 55 on pages 453-4.
The first assignment of error (Appellant's Brief,
page 6) relates to Finding of Fact No. 6, Record, pag·e
26, and is assigned by Appellant '''for the reason that
the finding is based on the fact that the State had accepted the Jennie J. Kearns' property to be used as a Governor's Mansion''. The finding recites that the State
·of Utah abandoned the use of said real property conveyed to it lby .S:alt Lake City for an exe·cutive mansion
or residence. This finding is ibased upon the evidence
adduced at the trial and it is presumed as a matter of
laV\r that the evidence \vas sufficient to support the
finding.
The Court further recites in said finding that by
the acceptance of the said real property conveyed to
Appellant by Jennie .J. Kearns and the use by the State
of Utah of sai.d property as its executive mansion and
residence for its Governor, Appellant did terminate it~
fee in the deed of conveyance. This portion of the finding is, as alleged by Appellant, based on the fact found
by the Court that the State had accepted the Jennie J.
Kearns' property to be used ~·~ a Governor's mansion,
but it is also based, as is set out. in the finding, upon the
further fa·ct of the use by the State of Utah of said JenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nie J. !(earns' property as its executive mansion or residence for the Governor.

The character of that lise

not show'll but is presun1ed to support the

IS

findi~g\

It can readily be ascertained then that the finding is
based upon 3 pojnts: 1. The abandonment by the State of
Utah of the real property conveyed to it by the City for
an exe~cutive. mansion or residence. 2. The a·cceptance of
a parcel of land from Jennie J. Kearns as an executive
mansion ·Or resiaence. 3. The ·use by the State of Utah of
·Said Jennie J. Kearns' property as its executive mansion
or residence. These ultimate faets found lby the Court.
are derived from the testimony and are supp.orted by
paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Respondent's Amended
Reply. (R. 16)
The Court, in Finding of Fact N.o. 3 (R. 26) found
as follo,vs: ''That the said defendant did on said day
accept said deed and the real property therein upon the
express limitation and qualification set out in said deed,
that is, in the event that the property described therein
was not used by the defendant for an executive mansion
or residence the said realty would revert to and become
the property of the plain tiff herein.''
The Court further found in its Finding of Fact No.
4 (R. 26) as follows: "That the defendant State of Utah
has not since the execution .and deli very of said deed or
at any time used the real property described therein for
an executive mansion or residence and the same has been
and no\v is vacant and unoccupied land.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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By a. reading of the Court's Finding No. 2 (:R. 24)
and as appears from Finding No. 3 a hove quoted the deed
from iSalt Lake City to the ~State of Utah was executed
and delivered July 9, 1895 and was aecepted by the State
of Utah on the same day. The findings were made and
entered February 18, 1941, or nearly forty-six years
after the execution and delivery of the deed to the State
of Utah. In accordance with F[nding No. 4 above quoted
th~ ·.State of Utah has not, during the entire period of
nearly 46· years, used the property described in the deed
of conveyance for any purpose or for a Governor's residence.
As appears from Finding No.3 above quoted the Appellant, State of Utah, accepted the property described
in said deed upon the express limitation and qualification
that the property should be used for a mansion or residence by the exe.cutive of the territory or the State of
Utah. The failure to use said property for a period of
46 years as an executive mansion in and of itself, without
some explanation, should determine the fee and terminate
the right of the State of Utah in said land. It might be
argued, however, that the State of Utah did not have
sufficient funds to erect an executive mansion and was
intending to do that some time in the future.
Finding of F'act No. 5 ( R. 26) reads as follows:
,., That the said defendant State of Utah pursuant to
Chapter 1'51 of the Law·s of Utah, 1937, an act of the
Legislature ·Of the State of Utah known as Senate Bill
N·o. 23,6, approved and effective February 24, 1937, did
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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accept a parcel of land conveyed by deed from Jennie J.
Kearns to the said defendant iState of Utah, which conveyance was dated April 28, 1937, and rec-orded in the
office of the County Re-corder of Salt Lake County in

=

.

::
.~
~

B·ook 198 of Deeds, pag·es 470-1, upon which land there
existed a. residence for the express purpose of using the
same as the residence of the Governor of the State of
Utah, and since ·Said time said residence and real property have !been and are now used by the defendant State
of Utah a.s the executive mansion or residence of the
Governor of said State.'' By this finding the State of
Utah has definitely determined to use other property,
to-wit, the .Jennie J. Kearns property for its executive
mansion. It has only one executive, therefore, the argument that it may still intend to use this property for a
Governor's re·sidence has no force. In addition to that,
·Chapter 151, Laws of Utah 1937, p-rovided as follows,
to-wit: ''The Secretary of ·state is hereby authorized to
accept as a gift on behalf of the State from Mrs. Jennie
J. Kearns the property a.nd improvements thereon, located at 603 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah,
to be used as a residence of the Governor of the .State of
Utah."

By the provisions of Section 1, Chapter 158, Laws
: ·of Utah 19·37, the sum of Fifty Th·ousand and no/100
~ ('$50,000.00) Dollars was appropriated by the State Legis~ lature for the ''Governor's residence, household sub.:. sistance and contingent expense''. By the provision of
1S'ection 1, ·Chapter 137, Laws of Utah 1939, the sum of
1

f
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Thirty-one Thousand and no/100 ($31,000.00) Dollars
was appropriated ·by the Utah L·egi~slature ''for the Governor's residence as ·created and designated by Chapter
1'51, Laws of Utah 1937, and the necessary expenses in·cident to the· Governor's residence and the household
subsistance and contingent expense relating thereto''.
From the reading of these ~statutes alone, without re·course fo the evidence as to the use made of the property
by the Appellant it appears that the State of Utah had
effectively determined not to use the property described
in the R.espondent 's deed. The Appellant used the Jennie J. Kearns' property from April 28, 1937, until the
date .of these 'findings, February 18, 1941, as the residence
for its Governor and appropriated the sum of Eighty-one
Thousand ($81,000.00) Dollars for the n1aintenance of
the property.
If there was ever any doubt that the lapse of 46 years
indica ted an intention not to use the property described
in the deed from S:alt Lake City to the State of Utah this
doubt is certainly destroyed and resolved in favor of
F'inding No. 6 made by the Court when the Sta.te of Utah
by Legislative Act accepted the Kearns property a.nd
used it for its Governor's residence. The Court found
by its finding No. 6 (R. 26) as follow·s: ''That the said
defendant ·State of Utah ahandoned the use of said real
property conveyed to it lby Salt Lake City for an executive mansion or residence a.s aforesaid and by the acceptance of the said real property conveyed to it by
Jennie J. Kearns as aforesaid and the use by the State
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of Utah as its executive n1ansion or residen·ce for it·s
Governor did terminate its fee in the deed eonveyirig
the real p-roperty from Salt Lake City plaintiff to the
State of Utah as aforesaid.''
The deed by which the Appellant derived its qualified fee carried the following qualifieation: ''by these
presents does grant-------~---------- ------------------------ unto the Territory
of Utah------------------------------------------------ so long as said premises shall
·. be used for a mansion or residen-ce by the executive of
: said territory or State of Utah. But in case said prop~ erty shall not be used by s:aid territory or the s:tate for
~ s:tn executive mansion or r~sidence then this d-eed shall
-~ become void and of no effect and said property, with all
: the improvements and appurtenances thereon· or thereto
~ belonging shall revert to and become the property ·Of said
. first party, as fully and absolutely as if this deed had
not been made''.
It is interesting to note that the consideration set
t~

·Out in said deed is the sum of One Dollar, and it is fur-

~~

ther interesting to note that the Legislature of Utah or
of the Territory of Utah has not by any formal act which
appears in any of the reported proceedings, Session Laws
or C'ompiled Laws accepted the gift of the land described
in said deed !by S.alt Lake City, nor has the State of
Utah lhy its Legislature so far as its reported Session
Laws or Compiled Laws indi·c~ate acknowledged that it
intended to use the property described in said deed for
any purpose. In fact, there is no legislative expres·sion
of any c:haracter affecting this real property. A state

n:
;{
:~

~~

m~
~e
~~

;J'
If~
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acts through its legislative body and acting in this manner has the same right with respect to real property as
an individual. 59' C. J ., ·States 27,6, at page 164.
The premises were in ac·cordance with the finding
never used by the State for a residence for its Governor
or for any other purpose.
It would seem that the failure to for1nally a·ceept the
tendered gift of tS:alt Lake City for the purpose it was
offered and the further failure to use the land for the
purpose limited by the deed should alone cause a reversion ipso facto to the Granto-r. Attention is called to
the fa·ct that failure to use the property for the purposes
limited in the deed results in rever~sion to the Grantor.
Th~

appellant, State of Utah, contends that it re-

ceived by conveyance a determinable fee sometimes
known a.s a qualified or base fee. ('Appellant's brief,
page 7) W·e do not disagree with this ~contention. Appellant's view is apparently that a determinable fee is
an estate limited with a qualification annexed to it by
which it. is provided that the fee must determine whenever the qualification is at an ·end. Appellant observes
at page 8 of its brief : ~'';Such deed provides for termination of the estate of Grantee by operation of law not
by act of the parties. * * * ''
It is our view that any estate received by appellant
was qualified and limited in the following: ''ISo long as
the premises shall be used for a mansion or residence by
the executive of the ·Territory or the ·State of Utah.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The further precaution: '·'But in case said property shall
not be used lby said Territory or State for an Executive
mansion or residence, then this deed shall beeome void
and of no effect a.nd said property with all the improvements and appurtenances th~reon or thereunto belonging shall revert, etc.'' is sin1ply a claus-e to clarify the
intention of the Grantor that the fee granted to appellant vvas lilnited solely to the use of the land for an executive mansion or residence and upon failure to so use
such premises the property should revert to the Grantor.
This but states the common law rul~ as to a fee determin, a;ble. When the appellant's position is examined, it is
all the more apparent that the land should revert to the
Grantor. What us-e of the land does appellant ·Contend
it has made~ The answer is, obviously, none.
What ·Opportunity has the appellant had to use the
land for an executive mansion or
·- of forty-six years.

residence~

For a period

The most striking language in this

~

[;· case, it seems to us, is that when the ·appellant did pro!!:
II·

~:

ij

.,;·
,.,
~~~
of(

vide its Governor with a residence it did not use this
property but it used the Jennie J. !{earns' property. 'rhe
appellant's answer. seems to be (appellant's brief, page
13) that the. property referred to in the deed of ~Salt L:ake
City must be used "for son1e other purpose than a Governor's mansion'' before a reverter will O'ccur. Appellant does not find this language in the deed. The eontention is drawn from its quotation taken from a few
words in one paragraph of the deed (appellant's brief,
page 14) ''but in case said property shall not be used
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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* * *." Surely the entire sentence is entitled to consideratiori in the construction and determination of the
1neaning of the deed. As will be seen.when the sentence
is read in its ·entirety -or adding a pa!t deleted from the
quotation ''for an executive mansion or a residence"
that the contention is obviou~ly· an error. Its meaning is
simply that the premises shall be used for an executive
mansion.· Therefore appellant's ·contention that the
pr~n1ises must be used :by appellant before a reverter occurs and that the use ~ust he for a. purpose other than
that descri~ed in the deed is not the proper construction
of the language of the ·deed.
· A reverter shall occur by operation of law as indicated by appellant when the property is not used as a
mansion or

resid~nce

of the. appellant's executive.

The qualifications set out in the deed certainly do
not carry the meaning that appellant may keep the fee
in the -real property forever without making use of the
property or until it attempts to use the pren1ises for a
purpose other than a. ~Governor's residence. Such construction "\vould permit the State to play "dog in the
manger". It '\\TOuld deprive the Gran tee of the use {)f
the land because Grant~e may only use it for the purpose
limited by the deed. It would also deprive the Grantor
of the use o.f the land because the fee rests in Grantee
until a reverter occurs. The effe-ct of that construction
would be to render the land. useless to anybody. There
is no ambiguity in the limitation of the Grantor nor in
the quality of the fee conveyed.
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The terms of the deed are direct, simple and understandable. They become difficult only h~: reason of
faulty argument.
Appellant like"·ise is in error in its contention \Yith
respect to the finding that appellant "had abandoned the

::

•
{

use of the property conveyed to it by respondent and that
the fee of the appellant terminated upon acceptance of
the l{earns property \\. as not supported by competent
evidence "Thieh could justify such a ·finding. * * * ''
(See Appellant's brief, page 10). T,,. o points are overlooked here: one, the court found that appellant had
alhandoned the use of said real property conveyed to it
by Salt Lake City fo_r an executive mansion or residence
(appellant's brief, page 6, Record page 26, Finding No.
6), and two, there is no evidence before the court for its
consideration and determination of whether or not the
finding is supported by ''competent evidence.'' 'The presumption is that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the
finding. The cases of appellant relating to the wbandonment of property b): a fee owner are not in point. We
are here dealing \Vith a lin1ited fee which is subject to a
possible reverter. The abandonment referred to in the
finding is an abandonment of the use of the property for
the purpose to 'vhich it vvas li1nited in the deed. The
evidence is presumed to support such finding ..
The appellant seems to be confused in its atte1npt
to distinguish bet\veen an estate upon condition and an
estate upon conditional limitation. The case of Yarborough v. Yarborough, (Tenn. 19·25) 269 S. W. 36, has
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been cited on page 9 of its brief to illustrate such distinction. There are in fact by the writers considered as
determina1ble fees four types.
~s.

In the case of Teb~ow· v. Dougherty, (Mo. 1907), 103
W. 985, the court observes at page 988:
"·There are four classes of such fees, viz., fee
upon condition, fee upon limitation, a conditional
limitation, and a fee e:onditional at common law."

The various types of fees have been considered in
cases which we will attempt to illustrate.
F;EE UPON CoNDITION.

·The fee upon condition is described very ·well in
Vol. 1, Restatement of the La"r of Property, page 59,
thus:
''The term 'condition subsequent' denotes
that part of the language of a conveyance, by
virtue of which upon the oc:currence of a stated
event the conveyor, or his successor in interest,
has the power to terminate the interest which ha.s
been created subj.ect to the condition subsequent,
but which will c·ontinue until this power is exercised.

a. Applicability to both present and future
interests. A eondition subsequent may be used
to qualify either a present or a future interest.
b. Power of Termination. "\Vhenever an
estate .subject to a condition subsequent is created,
s-ome person has the po,ver to tern1ina te this psSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tate upon the occurrence of the stipulated event.
·Thus such an estate does not end automatically
and by expiration as does an estate sulbject to a
special limitation. On the contrary, it is ·cut
.short, or divested, if, !hut only if, the person having the power chooses to exercise it. T~is option
to terminate an estate upon breach of a condition
subsequent is referred to in this Restatement as
a 'power of termination.'
Special Note: The interest herein described
as a 'power of termination' frequently is referred
to as a 'right of entry.' This latter term is not
used in this Restatement for two reasons. In the
first place, the interest of the person in whose
favor the condition exists, is not a 'right' as that
word is defined in par. 1. It is a 'power' as that
word is defined in par. 3. In the second place,
under modern law, an entry is normally not nec:essary in order to terminate the interest subject
to the condition. IDven if the instrument ere ating the condition expressly reserves to the c-onveyor a 'power to ·enter and to terminate' the estate created, no entry is essential. The interest
subject to su'Ch a power is terminated by any appropriate m·anifestation, upon the part of the person in whose favor the condition -exists, of his intent thereby to terminate the interest in question.''
There is also what is known as a conditional fee
which gave rise to estates tail. 10 R. C. L. Estates, 13
P. 6'56. ,such fees are distinguished from fees upon
condition a.s follows:
In the case of Yates v. Ya;tes, (Neb. 1920) 178 N. W.

262, at page 265, it will be ·observed that at common law
estates limited to the heirs of the body of grantee were
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known as conditional fees by reason that should the
grantee die without the particular

~eirs,

the land would

revert to the grantor. (See 10 R. C. L. Estates 9, p. 654).
f

FEE UPON LIMITATION.

In the case of Mills v. Da.vison, (N. J. 189'6) 35 Atl.
107~2,

the word ''limitation'' in its most technical sense

when used in the habendum clause of a deed is an appropriate term_ under which to declare the nature and
extent of the estate .granted and the uses for which the
grant is made.
As to the distinction between conditional fees and
limited fees, the court in_ the case of Smith v. Smith,
(Wis. 186-8) 99 Amer.

D~c.,

153, observed as follows:
1

There is n1uch subtile learning on the /hooks
in regard to the · distinction bet~reen conditions
and limitations in deeds so much that it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the 'vords
used are words of condition, making the. estate
voidable, or -words of limitation, making the estate to c.e.ase. In Professor Green leaf'·s edition
-of Cruise on Real P'roperty, title 13, chapte.r 2,
section 64, the author says : 'Lord Coke mentions :
a distinction between a condition· that defeats an
estate, but requires a re~entry, and a limitation
w·hich determines the estate ipso facto, without
entry. Of the first sort, it has been shown that a
stranger cannot 'take advantage; but -of limitations it is otherwise; as, if a man makes a }e.ase
quousque, that is, until J. S. returns from Rome;
the less-or grants over the reversion to a stranger;
'

1
'
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J. ,S. returns from R.ome; the grantee· of the reversion may take advantag'e of the return of J.
S., and enter, because the estate \Yas deterinined
by au express limitation.' In the editor's note 1
to this ~section, the different estates are distinguished in the following clear manner:'A condition is son1ething inserted for the
benefit of the grantor, gi.ving hin1 the power, on
default of performance, to destroy the estate if
he 'vill, and revest the estate in himself or his
heirs. As the law does not presume forfeiture,
it requires some express art of the grantor, as
evidenee of his intent to reclain1 the estate, viz.,
an entry.
':A limitation is conclusive of the time of continuance and .of the extent of the estate granted,
and beyond which it is declared at its creation not
to be intended to continue. Conditions render the
estate voidable by entry. Limitations render it
void without entry. If upon failure of that upon
which the estate is made to depend, no mutter ho'v
expressed in the deed, the land is to go to a third
per~son, this is a. limitation over, and not a condition. F'or if a condition, an entry by the grantor
'vould be necess~ary; and he might defeat the limitation by neglecting to enter. A limitation is imperative, and is determined 1by the rules of law.
A condition not only depends on the option of the
grantor, 1hut is also controlled by equity if the
grantor attempts to make au inequitable use of
it. The performance of a condition is excused by
the act of God, or of the law, or of the p~arty for
whos·e benefit it was made. A limitation determines the estate absolutely, whatever be its
nature.'
·See also 11 American Jurist, page 42, for an
instructive article on this branch of the la-\v. ''
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A

C'ONDITIONAL LIMITATION.

A conditional limitation is of a mixed nature and in
the ease of Smi.th v. Smith~ supra, was defined by Chancellor Kent as follows, p. 15~5:

''A .c~onditional limitation is of a mixed nature, and partakes of a condition and a limitation; as, if an estate be limited to A for life, provided that when ·C return from Rome it shall
thenceforth r~main to the use of .B in fee, it partakes of the na:ture of a condition, inasmuch as it
defeats the estate pr·eviously limited; and is so
far a limitation; and to be distinguished from a
c.ondition, that upon the contingency taking place,
the estate passes to the stranger without entry,
contrary to the maxim of law, that a stranger cannot take advantage of a condi•tion broken.'' 4
Kent's Com. 128.
The distinction 'between a conditiona-l fee and a conditional limitation is found in the ease of City NatiotW.l
B·~k

v. City of Bridgepo·rt, (Conn. 1929) 147 Atl. 181, at.
page 185:

.

''One distinguishing charac.teristic as b~tween these two forms of estates IS that 'a condition ·brings the estate back to the grantor or his
heirs; a condiltional limitation carries it over to
a stranger.' 21 C·orpus Juris, p. 930. 'In the cast)
of .a. condition the estate or thing is given absolutely vvithout limitation, but the title is subj.ect
to be divested ·by the happening or not happenmg
of an uncer'tain ·event. Wher·e, on the contrary,
the thing or estate is granted or given until an
event shall 4:a.ve arrived, and not generally with
a liability to ihe defeated by the happ·ening of the
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event, the estate is said to be g·iven or granted
subject to a linlitation.' ~ Bouvier's In st. 275; 2
,,
Bl· . Com. 1 tJ;J.
~~

A FEE

CoNDITIONAL AT ColVIlVION

LAw.

A conditional fee at common lavv is well defined in
. the case of Wi.Uis v. Mutual Loa;n & Tru,st Co., (N. C.
1922) 111 S. E. 163, at page 165:
"A conditional fee, at the con1mon law, was
a fee restrained to son1e particular heirs, exclusive of others, * * :;(, as the heirs of a man's
body. * * * No,v, 'vith regard to· the condition annexed to these fees by the common law,
our ancestors held that such a gift (to a man and
the heirs of his body) was a gift upon condition
that it should revert to the donor if the donee had
no heirs of his body; but, if he had, it should then
remain to the donee. They the ref ore called it a
fee simple, on condition that he had issue.'' 2 Bl.
Com. 110. "Which condition was implied in the
words as well as in the intent; for in that the gift
is to one and to his heirs of llis body, and no further, therein it is implied that, if he have no heirs
of his body, the donor shall have the land again.''
Willi on v. BerkleyJ Plowd. 23"5.
S.ee also· 10 R,. C. L. E·states 9, page 654.

A

DETERlVIIXABLE FEE IN

THis

CASE HAs R.EVERTED

TO GRANTOR.

!~·

The appellant in this cas·e aptly observes that the
~ fee gr.anted by the deed of ,salt Lake City to appellant
: was a limited fee. As is pointed out in appellant's brief,
~ page 8, in its quotation of the la.w of property from Sec~i
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tion 23, a limited fee has been defined to automatically
expire upon the occurrence of a stated event. As is used
in this re-staternent, the word lin1itation normally denotes the complete language of a conv·eyanee delimiting
the duration .and character of a created interest. This
is observed in 25 "\Vords & Phrases at page 300, where
the author further observes: ''The \vord is also used in
this re-statement distributedly to denote a part of the
limitation. ''
1

The appellant contends that the property should be
used 1by the State of Utah before the reverter occurs.
That Vlould seem to imply that there is a. condition attached to the deed l.n question. A fair construction of
the deed does not disclose such a condition. A distinction
·between a condition and a limitation has heretofore
been pointed out in the ease of Board of Chosen. Freeholders v. Buck, (N. J. 19·12) 82 Atl. 418, at page 420,
where the court observes :

., 'A distinction is, hovvever, made between a
condition in deed and a limitation, which Little~
ton denominates, also, a condition in law. For,
when an estate is so expressly confined and limited
by the words of its creation that it cannot endure
for any longer time than till the contingency happens upon which the estate is to fall, this is de·
nominated a limitation, as when land is granted
to a man, so long as. he is p·a.rson of Dale, or
while he .eontinue unmarried, or until out of the
rents and profits he shall have made £500., and
the" like. In such case the estate determines as
soon as the contingency happens ('vhen he ceases
to be a parson, n1arries a wife, or has received
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£500.) and the next subsequent estate, \Yhieh de-

pends upon such determination, becomes irnmedia.tely vested, 'vithout any act to be done by hint
who is next -in expectancy. But 'vhen an estate
is, strictly \speaking, upon condition in deed (as
if granted expressly upon condition to be void
upon the payment of £40. by the grantor, or so
that the gTantee continues unmarried, or provided
he goes to York, etc.) the law pern1its it to endure
beyond the time when such contingency happens,
unless the grantor or his heirs or assigns take advantage of the breach of the condition, and make
either an entry or a claim in order to avoid the
estate.'' ·See also, 4 l{ent 's Commentaries~ *126.
''It will thus be observed that, "\vhile i t may at
times become difficult to determine 'vhether a
given provision in .a deed or devise is to be recognized as a condition or a mere covenant _or trust,
the essential qualities and eharacteristics of a
limitation a.re too clearly defined to he easily confused. The words 'provided' or 'on condition'.
though appropriate to the creation of a condition,
may .also be appropriately used to introduce a
covenant or trust (Mackenzie v. Trustees of Presbytery of Jersey City, 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 61 Atl.
1027, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 22'7; Mills v. D avison, 54
N.J. Eq. 659, 3-5 Atl. 1072, 35 L. R. A. 113, 55 Am .
.St. Rep. 594) ; but the words 'so long as' followed
by the V\ 0l'ds 'and no longer' can have but one
significance, in the absence of some element clearly. disclosing that they were not designed to defeat the estate granted at the expiration of the
period of time named.
The provisions of the deed here in question
so clearly and adequately ere ate a limitation that
no field for construction appears to exist. The
habendum of the deed, '\vhich is wholly consistent
with all its other parts, and therefore deternlines
what estate is granted, is, 'T·o have and to hold,
* * ,~, so long· as the same shall be used for
1

1

1
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:(

the purposes her~in 'before mentioned and no
longer.' The period named marks the limitation ~;
of the estate as to time; at the end of that period
the determinable estate ceases, and the fee vest~ -·
in the grantor, ·Or his heirs, by reverter. The
words 'so long as the same shall be used for the
purposes herein before mentioned' are sufficient
for the creation of a limitation; the added words
'and no longer' rem·ove all possibility of doubt
touching the quality of the estate granted. It is ,
·clearly impossible to regard this language as not
having been intended to defeat the estate granted, ·
or as in th~ nature of a c:ovenant or trust.''
As a citation of authority f.or appeUant's point, as
above noted, the case of Y.arborough v. Yarborough,
supra, has been cited at page 9' of his brief, but it will
be observed by carefully reading that case, the whole
estate was passed to grantee and an estate was created
to arise in .a third pers.on. A bare fee determinable as
we find in the instant case· was not created and the limitation was over in favor of a. third person, to-wit, the owners of the original traet, and not to the grantor as is the
fact in the instant case. The court· in the cited case held
that the limitation over in a third person destroyed the
idea that if was the intention of the grantor to create a
simple fee determinable and obs-erved at page 38, '''when
a determinable fee ends, the estate reverts to the grantor
and his heirs.''
The court very aptly points out in the above cited
ease the difference between an estate in fee on condition
and on ~a. conditionallimit~tion thus, that the fee on condition leaves in the grantor a vested right, while a fee
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25

, on conditional limitation passes the vvhole interest to the
: grantor at once and creates an ·estate to arise and vest
~~

in ·a third person upon a c:ontingency at a future and un-

~:

certain time. It ,v.ould occur to us that the authority is

~:

~~
~

not applicable to the facts in this case.

~~

·The appellant further cites on page 10 of its brief,

Ill

51 A. L. R.. 1466 and 1473. 'These citations illustrate the

t

distinction between estates upon condition and estates

: upon conditional limitation. They do not consider limited fees.
,.._

.~

.,._
i.i
!iUH
f01§

~
r~~

~; ·.

j:

f

lD~
f~l
~

The citation ·On the same page, to-wit, 77 A. L. R.
345 (Note ·2), is coneerned with the inheritability of poss~bilities of reverter arising on the creation of fees of
less estate than fee simple absolute including c:onditional
fees, determinable feeis and fees ·conditional and in particular (note ·2) referred to relates to the distinction between possibilities of fee determinable, fees on condition and ·Conditional £ees. Here the author refers to a
limited fee as a qualified or determinable fee and defines
it ·as a fee terminating ipso facto upon the happening of
a specified contingency. ·The determinable fee or qualified fee is distinguished from the fee on ·condition which
the author desc.ribes as a fee subject to a re-entry on
the happening of a specified c.ondition. ·The determinable fee is further distinguish-ed from a ·conditional fee.
That is a. fee limited to the grantee and the heirs of his
body, which fee is probably better des·cribed in the ease
of Ma,tlock v. Locke, (Ind. 1905) 37 N. E. 171. It would
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occur to us, therefore, that neither of these citations are
in point.
As a bove -observed, the
1

f~e

in the instant case is a

liinited fee so long as the premises are used as a residence -or mansion for the executive of Utah. It is the
fee described as the fee upon limitation. Most writers
refer to the limited fee when discussing the determinable
or qualified or base fee. All of the various types of fee
a.re sometin1es considered under the head determinable
fe·e and therefore the reader must be very .careful when
the subj.ect is followed to discern just what character of
a. fee is referred to.
A determinable fee is generally defined as follows,
19 Amer ..Jur., Estates 28, page 486:
'

.

"·The definition ·most often quoted by the
·courts, vvhich is valuable because, a1though sweeping,- it incl:udes within its purview the fundamental incidents of the estate defined, states that a
~ determinabl,e '', 'qualified,' ·or 'base' fee is on
estate limited to a person and his heirs, with a
·qualifieation annexed 'to it by which it is provided
that it must determine whenever that qualification is at an end. Be~cause the ~estate may last
forever, it is a. fee; and because it may end on the
happening ·of 13.n event, it is called a "determinable or qualified f,ee.' Chancellor l{ent uses the
words 'qualified,' 'base,' and 'determinable' fee
promiscuously as defining an estate whi·ch may
continue forever, ibut is liable to !be determined
without the aid of a conveyance by some ·a.ct or
event circumscribing its continuance ·Or extent. He
adds: '·Though the object on \Yhich it rests for
perpetuity may be transitory or perishable, yet
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such estates are deemed fees, because, it is said,
they haYe a possibilit~· of enduring foreve.r ... It
is the uncertainty of the event and the poss1b1hty
that the f.ee may last foreYer thn t renders the e~s
ta te a fee, and not merely a freehold.' In his
historic \York on Estates, Preston re1narked:
'Thoug·h the estate w·ill determine \Yhen the event
marked as the boundary to the time of continuance shall happen, in the meantime the whole
estate is in the grante.e or owner, subject only to
a possiqility of reverter in the grantor. The
grantee has an estate which may continue forever,
though there is a contingency \vhich, \vhen it happens, will deternune the estate. 'This eontingency
cannot, with propriety, be called a 'condition;' it
is pa.rt of the limitation, and the estate may be
termed a '.fee.' Plo\Yden uses the phrase .'fee
simple determinable.' "
In 8 R. C. L. Deeds,

S~ection

157, at page 1100, a

distinction is made between estates on· condition and
. ., estates upon limitation, and also estates upon conditional
[

, · limitation, thus:

:t:
i

:"'

''The essential difference bet-\veen an estate
on condition and an estate in fee determining on
the happening of some future unc.ertain but possible event, with a limitation over conditioned on
the happening of the event, is that in the latter case
on the happening of the event the estate -either
reverts to the grantor or is carried by force of
the deed to the person to whom it was granted,
while in th~ former the .grantc;>r must have either
expressly or 1by necessary implication reserved to
himself or hi~ heir~s a right of entry on breach of
the condition, re-entry being necessary to rev.est
the estate. A condition is inserted for the benefit of the grantor, giving him the po\ver, on deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fault ·Of performance, to destroy the estate if he
·will. By failure to enter he may defeat the condi~ion, an~,. u~der certain _ci~cu~sta_nces, equity
m1ght forb1d h1s entry. A hm1tat1on IS conclusive
of the time of continuance and of the extent of
the estate granted, beyond which it is declared at
its creation not to be intended to continue, and
not only is no act ne-cessary on the part of the
grantor to terminate the estate, but the limitation
is imperative and under the rules of law determines the estate absolutely, whatever be its nature. A conditional limitation is of a mixed nature, and partakes of a condition and a. limitation; as, if an estate be limited to one for life,
provided on the happening of some ·other event
it shall thenceforth remain to the use of another
in fee, it partakes of the natur·e of a 1c.ondition,
inasmuch as it defeats the estate previously limited, and is so far a limitation ~and to be distinguished from a condition that on the contingency
taking place th~ estate passes to the stranger
-w.nthout entry, ~contrary to :the maxim !that a
st:vanger cannot take advantage of a condition
broken.''
·The event which marked the end of the fee granted
by 1S!alt Lake ·City to the State of Utah in the. deed under
consideration was the time when the premises were no
longer to. be used as an executive 1nansion. The court
found that the event had occurred, Record pages 24, 25,
26, that the premises were no longer to be used 3JS an
executive 1nansion, as is oihserved by R.e-statement of the
Law of Property, Vol. 1, page 19'5, S·ee. 56:
''·On the occurrenc-e of the event on which an
estate in fee simple defeasible is effectively limited to end in accordance with the terms of either
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a special limitation or an executory limitation,
such estate immediately .ceases. It is not necessary that the holder of the next succeeding interest take any action to terminate the estate.''

In the case of U. 8. Pipeline Company v. Delaw-a.re,
~ (N. J. 1898) cited in 42 L. R. A. 572, where the convey~ ance made was. so long as suitarble wag-on road was main: tained, the court observed at page 578:

,

''·The qualifying '\Yords in· the habendum
clause, 'to have and to hold', etc., 'unto the said
the Morris & Essex Railroad Company, and their
successors and assigns, forever, for all purposes
mentioned in said act of incorporation and the
several supplements thereto passed and to he
passed,' are simply a. qualification of the fee that
inured to the company by the operative w-ords of
grant. '·Of fee sin1ple,' says L·ord ·Coke, it is
commonly· holden that there .be three kinds, viz.,
fee simple absolute, fee simple conditional, and
fee simple qualified, or a base fee. But the more
genuine .and apt division were to divide fee, that
is, inheritance, into three p1a.rts, viz., simple or
absolute, conditional, and quali·fied or base. For
this word (simple) properly excludeth both conditions and limitations, that defeat or abridge the
fee.' 1 Inst. lb. 'Where an estate limited to a
person and his heirs has a qualification annexed
t.o it, by which it is provided that it must determine \Yhenever that qualification is at an end, it
is then called a qualified or base fee. As in the
ca·se of a grant to A and his heirs, tenants of the
manor ·of D·ale, '\Vhenever the heirs of A cease to
be tenants of the manor of D·ale, their estate deternlines.' 1 Cruise, Dig. 63 ( *79) 1 In st. 27 a. 'If
. land is given to a man and to his heirs as long as
he shall pa ~· 20s. annually to A or as long as the
ehurch of Rt. l)aul shall stand, his estate is a fee
1
'
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determinable, in \Yhich cHsc he has the
\vhole estate in him; and such per:petuity of an
estate which may continue forever, though at the
same time there is a contingency w·hich when it
happens \vill detern1ine the estate (which contiugency cannot properly !he called a condition, 'hut
a. limitation), m•ay be termed a fee sin1ple determinable.' (\V alsingha~ 's Case) 2 P1owd. 55i.
'Though the estate will deternline \\7hen the event
marked as the boundary to the time of continuance
.shall happen, in the meantin1e the \Vhole estate is
in the grantee or o\vner, subject· only to a. possibility of reverter in the grantor. The grantee
has an estate w·hich may continue forever, though
there is a contingency which, \vhen it happens, will
determine the estate. This contingency ·cannot.
with propriety, be called a C·ondition; it is part
of the lin1itation: and the est~ate may be termed
a. fee. Plo\Yden uses the phrase 'fee simple determinable.' 1 Preston, Estates, 431, 441, 442, 484.
·:Chancellor l{ent uses the \vords 'qualified,' 'base,'
or 'determinable' fee promiscuously as defining
an estate \Yhich may continue forever, but is liable
to be detern1ined \Vithout the aid -of •a c-onveyance
by so-me act or event eircumscribii1g its continuance or ·extent. And he adds : '·Though the object
on which it rests for perpetuity m,ay be transitory
or perisha,ble, yet such estates are deemed fees,
!because, it is said, they have a possibility of enduring forever '~' * *. It is the uncertaint~· of
the event, and the possibility that the fee may
last forever, that renders the estate a fee, and not
merely a. freehold.' 4 Kent, ·Con1. p. 9. ''The prop·
rietor of a qualified or base fee has the sa1ne rights
and privileges over his estate, till the qualific,a.tion
upon \Vhich it is limited is at an end, as if he were
a tenant in fee simple!' 1 Crp.ise Dig. 65 (*79)
Plo,vd. 5:57; 4 l{ent, Com. p. 11; ,Seymour's Case,
10 C-oke 97a; 1 Preston, Estates, 484. 'So long.as
the qualified fee remained, the grantor or his heu·s
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had no right of entering· upon the lands. If the
estate granted was terminated by breach of the
condition, then the 'vhole estate 'vas gone, and
there could be no partial forfeiture. He who enters for breach ·Of condition regularly shall have
the land of his first estate. '0'0. Litt. 202a.; Com,yns' Dig. p. ·533 (06); per ~Chief Justice Green,
MeKelway v. Seymour, 29 N. ,J. I.~. 3'2.9."

In the case of Mills v. Davison, ('N.J. 189~6) 35 Atl.
.
, 1072, at pag·e 1073, where the deed read:
-

''·T-o have and to hold unto the said party of
the second part and their successors forever, with
this express condition and limitation: that neither
the said party of the second part, nor their successors, shall at •any time sell, mortgag~, or in
any way convey the said land and premises, or any
part thereof, and that no building shall be kept,
maintained, or erected thereon, except for the
purpos~ of public worship and teaching in accordance with the usages, rites, and ceremonies of the
protestant Episcopal Church in the United States
of .1\merica, and also except the proper -outbuildings ·appurtenant thereto.''
1

.~ the court observed at page

~:
:~
·~
~

#

107·5 :

'''Th~

language of the habendum plainly indicates a conveyance for use exclusively for publie worship and teaching in c-onformity with the
rites and .eeremonies of the Protestant ~Episcopal
Church.''

In the case of Awmiller v. Dash, (Wash. 1909) 99
:· Pac. 583, a fee descri!bed '·'so long as said party * * *
~ shall use s~a.id strip of land for a private way * * *

r.1

Ill
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and no longer'' was held to be a determinable or qualified
f~e.

In the .case of McGaha;n v. MoGah01n, (Ind. 192·6) 151
N. E. 6'27, where the deed read: '·'And for a further consideration that at the death of Ella J. McGahan that the
above described land .shall revert back to ~Simeon McGahan, ' ' the court held at page 629':
''A fair interpretation of the clause, and its
effect upon the .granting clause, is that it created
what in common law was ·called a 'base fee'-a fee
which was to determine upon the happening of a
certain event.''
·In the case of White v.

S. W. ('2d)

Kevr~Atling,

(Mo. 19'39) 134

3~9,

where the dee:q read at page 41, "that
when such real estate was no longer used by the Bank of
Highlandville for a bank, that the same reverted to the
grantors or their assigns," the court held at page 44:
,., A reversion ipso facto is expressly provided for," and
at page 45: '·'The rights ·of the bank or its assignees,
however, will automatically cease and det~rmine if the
land is not used for the purpose of a hank. * * *''
In the case ·of Puffer v. Clark, (Mich. 1918) 168 N. \Y.
471, the -conveyance required the premises to be used as
a home for ministers of a church (page 472) or revert
to gran tor and the court held at pag~ 480:
· "IThey -conveyed, however, a conditional or
qualified fee, absolute until the condition is broken,
cand if broken the heirs of the gran tor take by
right of reverter.''
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In the case of U·nivcrsify of Ty erntont and St.ate AgT.
College r. Ward, (Vt. 1932) 158 Atl. 773, a lease as long
, as the grass gro\vs and the \Yater runs was urged to be
~ a fee and \vhile the court denied the contention by reason
. of a statute under \Yhich the lease \Yas given, it held at
1

...

~

~

page 776:
•'A determinable fee is a fee-simple estate
to a person and his heirs \vith a qualification annexed to it ;by which it is provided that it must
determine whenever the qualification is at an end.
·Common instances given in the books are a. limitation to one and his heirs so long a.s a certain tret
stands, or so long as A and his heirs shall pay B
a certain sum per annum, or so long as the property conveyed is used for a certain specified purpose. Such an estate may remain forever, or it
may terminate on the happening of the contingency upon which the estate is limited.''

•·

In the cas·e of Gillespie v. Broas, (1N. Y. 185'6) 23
Barbour's ,Supreme Court Reports 370, the court ob~
served at page 376 :

il

"The duration of the estate in the premises,
is, in terms, specified to he as long as they 'shall
lbe used and occupied for a county site for the
court house, jail and clerk's office of said county
of Schuyler;' and a limitation of the e.state to
that period is expresly imposed, by adding, that
'when said lot ·Or premises shall cease to be used
!or the purposes .aforesaid, then the sa.me, with
Its appurtenances thereunto belonging, is to revert
and belong to the party of the first part, his heirs,
executors, administrators or assigns, the same as
if this c-onveyance had not been executed.' 'The
effect of this specification and limitation is to
1
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make the estate a quali~fied or d~terminable feean estate which may continue forever, but which
is defeasible or conditional on an event provided
for. If the county should cease to use the lot or
premises. in the manner mentioned,· 'the estate
created by the deed w·ould thereby be determined.
and the title to the premises, including
build~
ings thereon, be revested in the grantor or his
heirs. ( 4 Kent's Coni. 9, 1'29). ''

all

Limited fees are considered in 10 R. C. L. Estates,
par. 8, page 652, thusly:
''Limited fees are estates of inheritance which
are restricted by or dependent upon the c.ondi.tions ·Or qualifications. They are divided into two
classes: first, qualified ·or determinable fees, ·Or
such as are frequently referred ·to as base fees;
second, fees conditional, which after the statqte
debonis become fees tail. A qualified or determinable fee is an estate limited to a person and his
heirs, \vith a qualification annexed to it by which
it is provided that it must determine whenever
that qua1ifica tion is at an end. Because the estate
may last forever it is a fee, and beeause it may
end ·On the happening of the event it is called a
determinable or qualified fee. Thus, where an
estate is conveyed in fee for a specified purpose
'apd no other,' the fee is a qualified fee, determinable upon the cessation of the use of the property for that purpose; and the same character of
estate is conveyed where the grant is in fee with
a remainder over upon the proviso that the
grantee die without heirs, or 'vhere, in default of
heirs, the land reverts to the donor. The rule i~
that the mere expression of a purpose will not
of and by itself debase a fee; and though the
qualification must be found in the instru1nent itself, no special or technical 'vords are required.
The \vords 'so long as,' or 'during the time that,'
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the property is used for a certain purpose, nsua 1ly create an estate subject to determination up_on
conclusion of that use, rather than a fee w1th
.condition subsequent. So clearly a deed providing that the land shall revert to the donor whenever it c.eases to be used or occupied for a specified purpose creates a 'determinable or qualified
fee.' A deed t.o a wife 'for during and so long as
she shall live, or remain a \\ridow,' creates a life
estate, determinable upon her remarriage. Natwithstanding the condition subsequently written
in the deed if the .estate is liable to become absolute, and continue perpetually in the first taker,
his or her heirs and assigns, the deed creates in
the donee a fee .simple conditional, or a fee of a
determinaible or conditional ·character, and not an
estate .or condition subsequent. The proprietor of
a determinable fee so long as the estate in fee
remains, until the contingency upon which the
estate is limited occurs, has all the rights and privileges over it that he would have if tenant in fee
simple. After such a grant no right of seisin or
possession remains in the grantor; all the estate
is in the grantee notwithstanding the qualification. Nothing remains in th~ grantor but a possibility ·Or right of reverter, which does not constitute an actual estate, and consequently it is not
the subject of devise, inheritance or grant. Such
a possibility of reverter is, however, capable at
all times of being released to- the person holding
the estate or his grantee, and if so released vests
an absolut~ ~and indefeasible title thereto; and
if the .event ·Occurs upon which the fee is limited,
the property reverts to the grantor without any
claim or act on his part.''
·

,.r.

'There can be no argument that the State of Utah
~- does not use the land in question for the purpose limited.
, ,,
1

It has held the land fo.rty-six years unused, by Legisla-

~
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tive Act determined to use other property and since has
actually used other property for its executive. mansion.
Furthermore, the eourt has found that the appellant's
fee has determined. That evidence cannot here be assail~ d. We respectfully submit that the judgment of the
·District Court should be sustained.
R.espect.fully,

E. R. CHRISTENSEN,
City Attorney,
GERALD IRVINE,

A.

PRATT KESLER,

Assista;nt City Attorneys.
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